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NOTE
EXHAUSTION OF TRIBAL REMEDIES REQUIRED
FOR HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW UNDER THE INDIAN
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Tiane L. Sommer
The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (hereafter ICRA)' extends
civil rights protections like those of the federal Bill of Rights to
those affected by actions of Indian tribal governments. The substantive rights enumerated in the Act 2 are enforced initially, and
often exclusively, in tribal forums. The only express remedy pro-3
vided in the Act is the writ of habeas corpus in federal court.
The Supreme Court has accordingly held habeas corpus to be the
sole federal avenue of relief under the Act in Santa ClaraPueblo
v. Martinez.4 The lower federal courts have since conformed their
holdings on the question as well. 5
Even before the Santa Clara decision limiting the federal
remedy in respect of tribal sovereignty, federal courts had read a
requirement of exhaustion of tribal remedies into those ICRAbased actions over which they had found jurisdiction under the
aegis of federal question jurisdiction. 6 Hence, the Arizona district

1. Specifically title I of the Act, codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1982).
2. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982). Its provisions are almost identical to the individual civil
rights guarantees of the federal Constitution. For a comparison see, e.g., Comment, The
Indian Bill of Rights and the ConstitutionalStatus of Tribal Governments, 82 HARV. L.
REv. 1343 (1969). See also Coulter, FederalLaw and Indian Tribal Law: The Right to
Civil Counsel and the 1968 Indian Bill of Rights, 3 COLUM. SURV. HuM. RTs. L. 49
(1971).
3. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982). The section reads: "The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall be available to any person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality
of his detention by order of an Indian tribe."
4. 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (per Marshall, J.). The case represents more than strict statutory construction; it rests on strong federal policy recognizing the sovereignty (albeit
"dependent") of Indian tribes. Id. at 62-63.
5. Compare Solomon v. LaRose, 335 F. Supp. 715 (D. Neb. 1971) (habeas corpus
not exclusive jurisdictional basis for federal ICRA enforcement) with Johnson v.
Frederick, 467 F. Supp. 956 (D.N.D. 1979) (habeas corpus action is exclusive remedy in
federal courts, and all other actions must be brought in tribal courts).
6. E.g., Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969), citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(federal question), § 1343(1), (4) (civil rights), and § 1361 (mandamus). See also Burnett
v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 1 T.C.R. [Tribal Court Reporter] A-51 (Rosebud Sioux Tribal
Ct. 1978) (tribal election) (on remand from South Dakota District Court).

57
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court in Dodge v. Nakai7 relied heavily on federal policy supporting tribal self-government in its listing of factors favoring (as
well as opposing) tribal self-government.9 Like many cases following it, however, Dodge stands as an exception to the rule supposed to have been established requiring the exhaustion of tribal
remedies. The exhaustion doctrine in the ICRA/habeas corpus
context thus stands as another example of a rule of law more
often honored and defined in its breach than in its observance.
This seems to be as true in the criminal habeas corpus cases as it
was in pre-Santa Clara cases involving civil matters.
Policies Facing the Federal Courts
The habeas corpus petitioner may be a non-Indian, an Indian
not a member of the tribe involved, or an individual tribal
member. While he may be enrolled in an Indian nation whose
political integrity deserves and is accorded deference, he will also
enjoy United States citizenship'0 and be entitled to claim protection under the ICRA as a federal statute. " By the terms of the
ICFLA "any person" aggrieved by tribal action and challenging
custody pursuant thereto possesses a right to test custody through
a federal writ of habeas corpus (subject, of course, to such limitations as the exhaustion-of-tribal-remedies doctrine).' 2 Any other
ICRA actions are left to tribal forums.' 3 When a petitioner
presents a claim to the federal court that is ripe for review, that
court is under a duty to exercise its jurisdiction under the ICRA.
This is so regardless of whether the federal judicial review is seen

7. 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968). Dodge v. Nakai is the first federal case decided
under the ICRA.
8. Citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
9. 298 F. Supp. at 25. See discussion infra.
10. The federal Citizenship Act of 1924 (43 Stat. 253), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2),

naturalized "Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States." Prior to that
act, many Indians had been made U.S. citizens. See D. GETCHES, D. ROSENFELT & C.

495-99 (1979).
11. ICRA protection extends to all U.S. citizens, although its focus is the governmental actions taken by the Indian tribes. See Burnett, An HistoricalAnalysisof the 1968
WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAw

Indian Civil Rights Act, 9

HARV.

J. LEGIS. 557 (1972); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,

436 U.S. 49, 61 (1978) ("a central purpose of the ICRA . . . was to 'secure for the
Ameican Indian the broad constitutional rights afforded to other Americans' ") quoting
S. Rep. No. 841, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1967).
12. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982). See supra note 3.
13. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 437 U.S. 49, 64 (1978); Trans-Canada Enter.,
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to contribute to the greater good of the tribe as a political
sovereign.
Individual federal courts may find habeas corpus review more
readily available, in compensation for the lack of federal jurisdiction over civil complaints arising under the ICRA, or for some
other reason, such as suspicion of the quality or integrity of tribal
judicial systems. Whether this can be justified is a question
resting on deeper political values-balancing policies favoring
tribal self-government with some measure of accountability outside tribal governmental systems (such as accountability to be had
in federal courts, as opposed to other federal forums). As a matter of law, however, both the plain statutory provisions of the
ICRA and the mandate of Santa Clara clearly operate to limit the
federal remedy to the writ of habeas corpus, and federal decisional law imposes the doctrine of exhaustion of tribal remedies
as a matter of comity.
Exhaustion: Question of Comity
The exhaustion doctrine is an incident of the comity that exists
between Indian tribes and the United States as sovereigns. That
an ICRA claim may be brought into federal court only by way of
the writ of habeas corpus is an instance of channeled subjectmatter jurisdiction in the federal courts. The exhaustion doctrine,
in the federal-state context as well as the federal-tribal context,
often is treated as though it too involves subject-matter jurisdiction. In fact, the requirement of exhaustion does not go to
federal jurisdiction but arises out of the notion of comity between
sovereigns. 1

The requirement of exhaustion of state remedies has its origin
in Exparte Royall,5 a decision limiting the 1867 statutory federal
jurisdiction that had made habeas corpus generally available to
state petitioners. Justice Harlan wrote for the Supreme Court in
this case: "We cannot suppose that Congress intended to compel
those [federal] courts

. . .

to draw to themselves, in the first in-

stance, the control of all criminal prosecutions commenced in

Ltd. v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 634 F.2d 474 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Frederick,
467 F. Supp. 956 (D.N.D. 1979).
14. "The rule of exhaustion 'is not one defining power but one which relates to the
appropriate exercise of power."' Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 420 (1963), quoting Bowen
v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27 (1939).

15. 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
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state courts .... "' As a result, the Court held, "salutary principles" of comity bestowed on the lower federal courts the discretion to decide whether to discharge a state prisoner t7 in the absence of "special circumstances requiring immediate action." 8
The legal guidelines implementing the policy of comity tend to
devolve into the political principles underlying the federal
judiciary's vision of "our Federalism"' 9 in the federal-state context. The respect of the sovereignty of the several states underlies
the policy, 20 just as respect for the sovereignty of the Indian
tribes leads to the application of the concept in the federal-tribal
relationship. Comity, wrote Justice Black in his last term, is
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact
that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state
governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National
Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are
left free to perform their separate functions in their separate
ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to
describe it, is referred to by many as "Our Federalism." ...
What the concept does represent is a system in which there is
sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National
Government, and in which the National Government, anxious
though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and
federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will
not unduly
interfere with the legitimate activities of the
States.2'
Equitable principles of federalism thus stand in the stead of formalism, regardless of whether the latter has ever truly obtained in
the United States. 22 In the federal-tribal context, the rationale
16. Id. at 251 (emphasis added).
17. In that case, state petitioners in custody awaiting trial.
18. 117 U.S. 241, 253 (1886).
19. The slogan "Our Federalism" was memorialized in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971) (Black, J.) (comity bars federal injunction of state criminal prosecutions begun
prior to institution of the federal suit, except in extraordinary cases if necessary to prevent
immediate irreparable injury).
20. See generally 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4264 (1978).
21. 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971) (emphasis added).
22. The suggestion that "equity" more nearly describes jurisprudence in the United
States, past as well as present, is entirely gratuitous to this paper, although the point is
related to the close relationship between federal Indian law and policy. Nonetheless, for
an example of supporting scholarship, see Note, Intent, Clear Statements and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892-915
(1982).
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supporting the application of the exhaustion doctrine, as an expression of comity, is more powerful if seen as flowing not from
the smooth functioning of a federalism but from the necessary
settlement of fractious relations between previously independent
sovereigns. Compare to Justice Black's explanation of comity the
following language from Justice Marshall's majority opinion in
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez:
As separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes
have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on
federal or state authority ...
In addressing this inquiry, we must bear in mind that providing a federal forum for issues arising under [25 U.S.C.] §
1302 constitutes an interference with tribal autonomy and selfgovernment beyond that created by the change in substantive
law itself. Even in matters involving commercial and domestic
relations, we have recognized that "subject[ing] a dispute arising on the reservation among reservation Indians to a forum
other than the one they have established for themselves,"
Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 387-388 (1976), may
"undermine the authority of the tribal court... and hence...
infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves."
Williams v. Lee, supra, 358 U.S., at 223. ...
Our reluctance is strongly reinforced by the specific
legislative history underlying 25 U.S.C. § 1303. This history,
extending over more than three years, indicates that Congress'
provision for habeas corpus relief, and nothing more, reflected
a considered accommodation of the competing goals of "preventing injustices perpetrated by tribal governments, on the
one hand, and, on the other, avoiding undue or precipitous interference in the affairs of the Indian people." 23
The differences between the passages are more of style than substance.
The history of federal Indian law is replete with instances of
judicial law making, unprincipled policy making by the executive
branch or administrative agencies, and dramatic legislative responses to perceived economic and social circumstances. Yet
throughout that history there has always been recognition, if not
respect, for the original autonomy of the Indian tribes as

23. 436 U.S. 49, 62-67 (1978).
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sovereigns. The balance of the relationship is thus not entirely un-

like "our Federalism." The tribal-federal dialectic, however,
flows from the subordination of the autonomous sovereigns. The
extension of federal law then becomes an apology for, a description of, and a prescription for federal control. This is balanced
against the support for Indian self-determination as an apology
for, a description of, and a prescription for the survival of the Indian tribes.
That the judicial doctrine of exhaustion as an expression of
comity should be even stronger in relation to tribes than it is in
relation to states, then, emerges inevitably as a political opinion
informed by history.

The discretion in the federal courts as to the availability of
habeas corpus is a device that maintains the balance or the tension between federal and tribal sovereignties.2" The restricted
availability permits the retention by the tribes of a large degree of

control over a great deal of substantive and procedural criminal
law.
Waiver of the Exhaustion Requirement

In the evolution of the exhaustion doctrine in the federalism
context, because the doctrine expresses comity, not subject-

matter jurisdiction, it is possible for a state expressly to waive its
defense that state remedies were not exhausted; it may even waive
the question by failure to raise it in the federal district court.25
The federal court does retain the discretion, however, to conduct
26
its own inquiry into whether state remedies were exhausted.
24. This is seen, for example, in the extent to which the substantive standards implementing the ICRA's bill of rights harmonize with the federal standards the ICRA was intended generally to extend to tribal actions. For a discussion of some of the effects on
federalism of the availability of and limitations on habeas corpus review, see Cover &
Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035,
1042, 1047-49, 1052-54 (1977).
25. See, e.g., Wiegand v. Seaver, 504 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, app. dismissed, 421 U.S. 924 (habeas corpus granted where state stipulated exhaustion of
remedies would be futile); West v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd in relevant part en banc, 510 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers,
372 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1967) (state waiver given effect in interest of full and prompt adjudication of all matters in controversy). But see United States ex rel. Johnson v. Vincent,
507 F.2d 1309 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 994 (though exhaustion requirement
not jurisdiction but matter of comity, court may permit the issue to be first raised on appeal).
26. Zicarelli v. Gray, 543 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1976) (express state concession that
remedies exhausted does not avoid a need for independent inquiry by the federal court);
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FederalJurisdictionalAlternatives
Whether an alternate remedy to the writ of habeas corpus may
yet exist is not addressed by this paper. In comparison, however,

such an alternate remedy for state petitioners generally is considered to be unavailable, relegating them to pursuit of state

remedies before they may avail themselves of the conventional
federal habeas corpus route. The question whether an alternate

basis for federal jurisdiction may credibly be found has been addressed by at least one writer." Although that paper was pub-

lished before the Supreme Court settled the question in practice,
in Santa Clara, it is worth brief coverage. The paper considered
42 U.S.C. § 1983 as an alternative to civil rights jurisdiction of 28
U.S.C. § 1343(4), but found two major barriers: first, that section 1983 did not comprise a congressional waiver of tribal
sovereign immunity, and second, that courts have refused to rule

that a tribe is the equivalent of a state or territory for the purposes of section 1983.28
It has been said in one authoritative commentary that, apart
from tribal remedies and federal habeas corpus review, ICRA
guarantees may be enforced through defendants' claims in federal
or state courts, 29 and will bind the Department of the Interior in

its federal supervisory actions over tribes, such as approval of
tribal legislation.3
The exhaustion doctrine, and indeed the restriction of federal
remedies under the ICRA to habeas corpus review, should not be
seen as judicial extinguishing of civil rights. Instead, the ICRA

Rose v. Dickson, 327 F.2d 27 (9th Cir. 1964) (same even when parties do not raise issue
on appeal).
27. Note, Remedies: Tribal Deprivation of Civil Rights: Should Indians Have a
Cause of Action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?, 3 Am. INDMAN L. REV. 183-95 (1975). The
equally interesting question whether an alternate cause of action might be sustained under
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) is well beyond the scope of this paper. However, section 1985(3) carries its own substantive provisions and it is unlikely it could be construed to support
ICRA substantive claims. It would have to be used in its own right (so to speak), no
doubt, and its elements (e.g., requiring class-based animus) are unrelated to the ICRA
guarantees.
28. Note, supra note 27, at 187. The note attempts to circumvent both stated barriers
without (this author believes) much success. Id. at 187-91. To controvert either one is inimical to a basic proposition of federal Indian law: that congressional infringement on the
tribes must be express.

29. F.

COHEN'S FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

69 (Strickland et al., eds. 1982).

30. Id., citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 66 n.22 (1978).
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extended civil rights guarantees to those affected by tribal governmental action. Tribal forums, federal judicial and administrative
enforcement forums, and potentially state forums have and will
implement those guarantees. 3 ' The net impact of the ICRA's extension of civil rights standards is to bind Indian tribes as
sovereigns in their actions, where previously the tribes had not
been accountable to the strictures of another sovereign (i.e., had
not been bound by the federal Constitution).3 2 To limit the availability to petitioners of federal habeas corpus review is to limit
the intrusion on tribal sovereignty posed by the ICRA. The limitation channels ICRA claims to tribal forums; for those in
custody, initially to tribal forums, after which there remains the
federal habeas corpus avenue of relief to follow the good-faith
exhaustion of tribal remedies.
One consequence of the exhaustion doctrine is a limitation on
the total number of cases heard in federal court involving criminal procedure under the ICRA. Some of those in tribal custody
will obtain relief through tribal forums; others may be satisfied
with tribal remedies regardless of whether their results are
favorable. It seems likely, however, that a petitioner who was
willing in the first instance to seek the federal writ-crossing such
barriers as time, expense, cultural and geographic distance, 33 even
language and literacy impediments, and possibly socio-political
disapproval within the reservation toward those who upset the
apple cart-will be likely to pursue tribal remedies and then return to the federal forum if still dissatisfied.
That tribal courts adjudicate most ICRA claims not only
strengthens tribal self-government or sovereignty in general, but
supports specific tribal institutions and increases the diversity of
local interpretations of ICRA civil rights standards. Although the
trend of tribal judicial forums is toward increasing formal struc31.

See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
32. See Note, In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1058,

1062-64 (1982). Cf. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 62, set forth in pertinent
part supra at text accompanying note 23.
33. Most Indian reservations are located in rural areas, far from federal and state
courts. When county courts and justice courts are nearby, they are usually in border
towns where hostility toward Indians may run high and sympathy for Indian values may
be lacking. Thus Indian courts located on reservations have the advantages of being convenient to the persons who will use them and are the most likely forums to do justice in
specific situations. See NATIONAL AMERICAN INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASS'N, INDIAN COURTS
AND THE FUrUREa 88-92 (D. Getches ed. 1978), reproduced in part in GETCHES, ROSENFELT
& WILKINSON, supra note 10, at 317.
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tures,3 4 many appellate as well as trial court opinions are still not
reported. Of these, some are not recorded, some are recorded
only on audio tape, and many are given in the tribal language.
The relative inaccessibility of much decisional law should contribute to its local diversity for some time.
Exhaustion Doctrine Before Santa Clara
In one habeas corpus case following the ICRA and preceding
Santa Clara by nine years, a petitioner was permitted to proceed
in federal court even though tribal remedies had not been ex35
hausted. The appellate court in Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court
gave a draconian
extension to the already broad conception of
"custody ' 3 6 in order to hear the case'.3 Because tribal remedies
had not been exhausted, the federal court should have ruled the
claim not ripe for review and remanded for continued pursuit of
tribal appellate proceedings. 3 Even had some implied or express
waiver by the tribe of the defense of lack of exhaustion occurred,
an independent judicial inquiry into the circumstances of the case
should have found no basis to except it from the exhaustion requirement.
It may be suggested that the Ninth Circuit was influenced in
Settler by the belief that the Yakima Tribal Court was a federal
instrumentality because of federal involvement in and responsibility for its existence. Although it is very likely that factor was determinative to the result, it should not have been. Even had the
tribal court properly been analogized to a federal administrative
court, the petitioner's claim was not ripe for federal habeas corpus review because tribal remedies had not fully been pursued.
Civil cases had also been held subject to the exhaustion requirement. Federal courts in a number of cases had dismissed for
failure to exhaust tribal remedies.39
34. See discussion infra in text accompanying notes 85-88.
35. 419 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970).
36. In other federal habeas corpus cases a very broad conception of "custody" has
developed. See, e.g., Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973) (state prisoner
already released on own recognizance); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968) (petitioner's
sentence was to be served in the future).
37. The petitioner in Settler had received merely a fine at the hands of the Yakima
Tribal Court and had posted bond pending appeal. The Ninth Circuit's ruling as to
custody is questionable, especially as it raises questions similar to those involved in the exhaustion doctrine, to wit, recognition of tribal appellate avenues of relief.
38. Cf. Burnett v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 1 T.C.R. A-51 (Rosebud Sioux Tribal Ct.
1978) (on remand from South Dakota District Court for exhaustion of remedies).
39. E.g., O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir. 1973);
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The lack of pursuit of tribal remedies in Dodge v. Nakai4 was

quite plain: the plaintiffs admitted they had never presented their
claims before the Navajo Tribal Court."' In this first case under
the 1[CRA, the district court read an implied exhaustion requirement 2 into the Act. Nonetheless it held that the requirement did
not have to be met in the case before it. 3 It reasoned that because
a number of claims were involved, the "policies giving rise to the
concept of pendent jurisdiction '

44

permitted an exception to be

made.
The court listed the following factors in support of its impli-

cation into the ICRA of the exhaustion doctrine:
(1) A perceived strong congressional policy to vest the Navajo
tribal government
with responsibility for its own affairs, citing
45

Littel v. Nakai.

(2) A "recognized federal policy" to enhance the development
of an independent Indian judiciary, citing Williams v. Lee.46
(3) A general observation'47that: "No doubt many of these cases
could be resolved locally."

The court went on to cite factors it believed would "militate
against the implication of a condition of exhaustion ' 4 into the
ICRA. The first is peculiar to the case before the court: several of
the defendants were non-Indian "and, as such, would not be pro-

per parties in a tribal court." ' 49 The second factor reached to the

Jacobson v. Forest County Potawatomi Community, 389 F. Supp. 994 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
See generally COHEN, supra note 29, at 669.
40. 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968).
41. Id. at 25.
42. As well, of course, as a federal-question basis for civil jurisdiction. Id.
43. The case involved an action by a non-Indian lawyer (director of the Navajo
Legal Services Program). That may have influenced the court as well. Id. at 26.
44. Id., citing UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
45. 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966). Littel involved an
action on a contract brought by a non-Indian lawyer (general counsel to the Navajo
Tribe). The Ninth Circuit held the case was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Navajo
tribal courts. Id. at 490. The case preceded passage of the ICRA.
46. 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1959).
47. 298 F. Supp. at 25.
48. Id. at 25-26.
49. Id. at 26. It must be noted that some argue that non-Indians are not only proper
parties plaintiff in tribal court, see Littel v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965), but
under many circumstances, proper parties defendant as well. See generally COHEN, supra
note 29, at 252-57, 342-43. It may be that in Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz.
1968), the parties would have so aligned in the tribal court that the non-Indians would
have been parties plaintiff with their claimed violations of the ICRA.
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Act's legislative history to show that Congress had been concerned about providing effective remedies for the rights established in the Act. 0 Finally, the court added that to require an exhaustion of tribal remedies in the case would result in complex
litigation since some of the claims before it would continue while
others might reappear following tribal court rulings.
The first two factors run counter to the ICRA's legislative
history. The ICRA covers all persons, including non-Indians, and
Congress was interested in "avoiding undue or precipitous interference in the affairs of the Indian people.""1 Such interference
occurs when federal courts take on habeas corpus claims while
tribal courts lose an opportunity to adjudicate issues involving
tribal governmental actions. The third factor is at least credible,
although the court should have given further thought to how it
might handle the case by retaining its non-ICRA claims while the
tribal court took the ICRA-related aspects. The case was far from
a paradigm of complex litigation and retention of jurisdiction
pending resolution of claims in other forums (tribal, state,
administrative, or arbitrative) is far from unknown.
In effect, then, the court in Dodge propounded a balancing
test in its requirement of exhaustion of tribal remedies, resting on
facts peculiar to the case before it. Whatever the merit of the
third factor of the considerations underlying pendent jurisdiction,
it is not applicable to the habeas corpus cases. Criminal habeas
corpus claims are not directed to non-Indian parties respondent.
They are also unlikely to involve questions not properly before
the tribal courts.
After Dodge v. Nakai, habeas corpus cases in federal courts
were held subject to the exhaustion doctrine although exceptions
were often found. Further, in some cases the question was not
discussed, even though an examination of the facts indicates
tribal remedies were not exhausted and the federal district court
should have conducted its own inquiry into the matter.
In Big Eagle v. Andera, 2 for example, the South Dakota
district court examined some interesting issues (whether tribal ordinances were vague or overly broad) without pausing to discuss
50. The Supreme Court in Santa Clara looked to the same legislative history to find
support for its general restriction of federal remedies to habeas corpus review. Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
51. Id. at 67 (citing Summary Report II).
52. 418 F. Supp. 126 (D.S.D. 1976). The case was on remand from the Eighth Circuit, 508 F.2d 1293, 1297, for an evidentiary hearing on the Crow-Creek Sioux Tribal

Court's construction of the disorderly conduct ordinance.
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exhaustion of tribal remedies. Both petitioners had appeared in
tribal court and had pled guilty to the charges, and approximately
one month later filed habeas corpus petitions under 25 U.S.C. §
1303. They had not contested the validity of the tribal disorderly
conduct ordinances to the tribal trial or appellate forum. There is
no indication that a meaningful tribal remedy did not exist. The
subject matter centered on tribal legislation and the tribal court's
construction thereof; thus the tribal courts were more appropriate
for adjudicating the claims before they were entertained in
federal court.
A relatively conventional exception to the rule of exhaustion
was found in Wounded Knee v. Andera"l on the basis that the
tribal remedy was exhausted for practical purposes and further
motions by the petitioner would have proved futile. The petitioner had contested the practice of having the tribal judge act in
the dual capacity of both tribal judge and prosecutor, under
ICRA rights to a fair and impartial trial and to due process of
law. She had made the claim before the tribal court and had attempted to appeal according to the Crow-Creek Tribal Code six
54
months before she filed her petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The case was heard by the district court judge who had heard
Big Eagle v. Andera,5 Judge Bogue. The first hearing was held
eighteen days before the opinion in Big Eagle was issued.
Possibly because the tribe or its counsel had gained experience
from the previous case, it appears to have raised the defense of
the exhaustion requirement and Judge Bogue turned first to
whether exhaustion of tribal remedies was required.16 The petitioner argued that the ICRA's provision for habeas corpus,"
unlike the federal habeas corpus statute applying to state
prisoners, 58 contains no explicit language requiring exhaustion of

5:. 416 F. Supp. 1236 (D.S.D. 1976).
54. Id. at 1237-38.
55. 418 F. Supp. 126 (D.S.D. 1976). Judge Bogue's opinion in Wounded Knee, 416
F. Supp. 1236 (D.S.D. 1976), was issued Aug. 13, 1976; the hearing in the latter was held
July 8, 1976.
56. Irma Wounded Knee had filed a petition for appeal with the clerk of the tribal
court, who was directed by the tribal code to forward it to the "chief judge." Judge
Andera was the only tribal judge on the reservation, although Elnita Rank, chairperson
of the tribe, testified that she would have set the machinery in motion to construct an appellate tribunal had the matter come to her attention. 416 F. Supp. at 1238.
57. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982), set forth supra note 3.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982).
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remedies; thus no such exhaustion should be required by the
courts.
The court considered the petitioner's attempt to argue strict
statutory construction:
The argument seems logical enough, and if we had only the
statutes and no case law, we might be inclined to accept it. This
Court concludes, however, that the case law which has arisen
under the Indian Civil Rights Act evidences a very strong
policy favoring exhaustion of all tribal remedies before federal
courts get involved in tribal disputes and we conclude there is
no reason to cast aside the exhaustion doctrine when petitions
for writs of habeas corpus are filed. This Court holds explicitly
that tribal remedies must be exhausted before petitioning in
federal court for a writ of habeas corpus.5 9
The court phrased its holding as it did because it applied ICRA
civil case law to the habeas corpus petition before it. Had no case
law yet arisen applying the exhaustion doctrine to ICRA claims,
however, the court should not have accepted the petitioner's
argument. The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies, as a matter of
comity in federalism, was originally fashioned judicially6" and
was codified only later. The Ninth Circuit, furthermore, had
already resolved the "strict construction" argument in an ICRA
habeas corpus case cited by Judge Bogue. 6' The latter case also
held that exhaustion is normally required in habeas corpus proceedings from tribal court.
Judge Bogue relied on Janis v. Wilson 62 where the exhaustion
doctrine as applied to potential tribal remedies was controlling:
"The invocation of this power [federal] necessary for the efficacy
of the Indian Civil Rights Act is, however, ordinarily conditioned
on the exhaustion of tribal remedies, both administrative and
judicial." 6 3 Hence, the tribal remedy need not be to appellate
court, or formal; it need only be meaningful.

59. 416 F. Supp. 1236, 1238 (D.S.D. 1976).
60. Exparte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), discussed supra text accompanying notes
15-18.
61. United States ex rel. Cobell v. Cobell, 503 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 999 (1975).
62. 385 F. Supp. 1143 (D.S.D. 1974).
63. Id. at 726-27.
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Oddly, Judge Bogue cited O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux

Tribe" as "[t]he seminal case in this area... wherein the Eighth
Circuit examined the congressional policy behind the Indian Civil
Rights Act and determined that generally plaintiffs who do not
exhaust tribal remedies in civil disputes
with a tribe are prohibited
'6
from bringing suit in federal court."
Whether pursuit of tribal remedies would be meaningful is an
important element of the exhaustion doctrine, as is appropriate
for an equitable comity-based judicial doctrine. In Wounded
Knee v. Andera the court considered this factor at length, as its
second concern, before proceeding to the merits of the
petitioner's claim. The court's determination was based on factual inquiry, but noted several other ICRA civil cases in support
of its conclusion that Wounded Knee had "as a matter of law exhausted her tribal remedies." 6
Any remedy potentially available to Petitioner through the
tribal appellate process was rendered ineffective and meaningless by official delay and inaction. Therefore, the requirements of exhaustion in this case have been met, and this Court
will proceed to the merits.
We will state first, however, that our conclusion as to the efficacy of the appeal procedure on the Crow Creek Reservation
is not intended to discredit the system of justice now operating
there.... This Court urges the tribe to implement and refine
the appellate procedure authorized in the Crow Creek Tribal
Code.... The defect was not with the Tribal Code nor with

the character of the persons involved; rather, there has simply
been no recent, serious effort to make the appellate court a
reality. Until such an effort is successfully made, the tribal
court itself is the court of last resort on the Crow Creek Reservation. 67
As a general rule, the court said, proof that resort to remedies
provided by the tribe would be futile will excuse the petitioner
from "go[ing] through the motions of exhaustion. ' 68 This may
occur when a tribal remedy provided in theory is nonexistent in
64. 482 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir. 1973).
65. Wounded Knee v. Andera, 416 F. Supp. 1236, 1238 (D.S.D. 1976).
66. Id. at 1239.
67. Id. at 1240.
68. Id. at 1239, citing Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Driving Hawk, 534 F.2d 98 (8th Cir.
1976); Janis v. Wilson, 521 F.2d 724, 729 (8th Cir. 1975).
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fact, or at best inadequate, as was the case for Wounded Knee. 69
The "meaningfulness" exception in the exhaustion doctrine is
well established in habeas corpus law. It was aptly applied in
another case decided by the Eighth Circuit a year later, Necklace
v. Tribal Court of Three Affiliated Tribes.70 The circuit court remanded for further proceedings in the case, primarily on the
basis that the tribal laws contained no formal procedure for
habeas corpus to which the petitioner could resort. The court was
clearly influenced, however, by the fact that the petitioner had
been confined for approximately five years in the North Dakota
State Hospital pursuant to the tribal court's involuntary commitment order.
While it appears that there are informal procedures by which
Necklace might seek relief in the tribal courts, it further appears that the laws of the TAT [Three Affiliated Tribes] contain no formal habeas corpus procedure. Under these circumstances, we hold71 that Necklace is not required to exhaust
her tribal remedies.
The better reading of this language is to take the reference to
"circumstances" to specify Necklace's lengthy confinement. That
tribal avenues of relief were informal court procedures should not
have been dispositive; there was no showing that resort to them
would have been futile. The court acknowledged "as a matter of
comity, that tribal remedies must ordinarily be exhausted before
a claim is asserted in federal court under the Indian Civil Rights
Act, ' 7 2 and referred to a balancing process weighing "the need to
preserve the cultural identity of the tribal courts, against the need
to immediately adjudicate alleged deprivations of individual
rights." ' 73 Hence, not the informality of tribal remedies but the
petitioner's need for immediate, certain hearing of her claim, was
dispositive.
Indeed, Necklace's habeas corpus petition was unfortunately
delayed because the North Dakota District Court had dismissed it

69. 416 F. Supp. 1239, citing Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975); Schantz
v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67, 70 n.6 (8th Cir. 1974); Brown v. United States, 486 F.2d
658 (8th Cir. 1973).
70. 554 F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1977).
71. Id. at 846.
72. Id.
73. Id., quoting O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140, 1146 (8th
Cir. 1973).
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for failure to exhaust state remedies. 74 The Eighth Circuit made
short shrift of that, however, noting that the petitioner was not in
custody pursuant to a state court judgment. The confusion at the
trial level had evidently occurred because Necklace was confined
in a state institution.
Civil Cases After Santa Clara
The initial question that must be posed in federal court treatment of ICRA-based civil cases is whether the court may take jurisdiction at all. Some federal courts have treated the question as
if it were a matter of comity, and not of jurisdiction.
In an action reminiscent of Dodge v. Nakai and with a decision
displaying similar thinking, the Tenth Circuit gave the nod to an
action by non-Indians for damages in Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v.
Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes. 5 Its decision was based primarily
on the fact that a tribal forum was apparently denied the plaintiffs. The court also referred to the character of the plaintiffs as
"the issue relates to a matter outside of
non-Indian and said that
76
internal tribal affairs."
Unavailability of a tribal forum should not have persuaded the
circuit court; it was the clear holding of Santa Clara that only
habeas corpus cases may properly be before federal courts under
the ICRA. 77 It is not for the courts of one sovereign to assume
cases they find to be without forum in another sovereign's legal
system. Because the Indian tribes are "dependent sovereigns,"
they are subject to the ICRA and it is Congress that has plenary
power over the tribes. Thus it is for Congress to decide whether
federal remedies additional to habeas corpus are required to accomplish its purposes.
As discussed previously, that the plaintiffs were non-Indian
also should not have been persuasive. 78 They would have been
proper parties plaintiff before the tribal court, and it is very likely
that informal tribal procedures were available. It should have
been much more important to the federal court that it subjected
an Indian nation to a civil suit for damages. Going to the merits,
the issue of whether a taking occurred on the tribe's reservation
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 845.
623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981).
Id. at 685.
436 U.S. 49, 69-71 (1978).
See supra note 49 and supra text accompanying note 51. See also Burnett, supra

note 1].
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land that may have damaged the plaintiffs' business adjacent to
the reservation no doubt involved questions most competently reviewed in some tribal forum, whether formal or informal, judicial
or otherwise.
Finally, that tribal activity on reservation land was the basis of
the action brings the subject-matter patently within the purview
of the tribe. Activities on reservation land, and certainly tribal activities thereon, have long been recognized to be a traditional
basis for tribal civil jurisdiction." 9 The Dry Creek Lodge decision
has been severely criticized.8"
Yet Dry Creek Lodge has been perceived by one district court
to state a rule of access to federal court involving solely the factor
of availability of a tribal forum. The Utah District Court in Kenai
Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Department of the Interior81 dismissed the
claim before it on the basis that no ICRA violation had been alleged. Nevertheless it chose to cite Dry Creek Lodge to support
its statement in dictum that "where no tribal remedy is available
a plaintiff may have access to a federal forum" for an ICRA civil
claim.12 Ultimately, if that federal forum is Congress, perhaps
this is so, but taken as intended, the statement is an unfortunate
one. Not only does it purport to offer a basis for federal jurisdiction unsupported by the ICRA, the pertinent case law, 3 or much
of federal Indian policy, but it is a broad statement unnecessary
to the case."
More fortunately, because the court dismissed the claim, its interpretation of Dry Creek Lodge and hence its rejection of Santa
Clara's result are pure dictum. The opinion carries no weight of
its own accord.
IntertribalCourt System
Tribal judicial as well as legal systems are developing structurally; a recent creative example is the Northwest Intertribal
79. E.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), and cases cited therein. See
generally COHEN, supra note 29, at 246, 252-57.
80. "The decision seems clearly wrong." COHEN, supra note 29, at 668 n.52.
81. 522 F. Supp. 521 (D. Utah 1981), aff'd 671 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1982).

82. Id. at 530.
83. See, e.g., R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Auth., 509 F. Supp. 933
(D. Mont. 1981) (rejecting reasoning and result of Dry Creek Lodge). See generally Note,
Indian Sovereignty and Judicial Interpretations of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 1979
WASH. U. L.Q. 897, 912-18 (1979).

84. Although the court would have required that a plaintiff affirmatively show that a
tribal remedy had been sought and proven unavailable. Kenai, 522 F. Supp. at 529-30.
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Court System. It was set up to provide an appellate forum" for
fourteen tribes in the state of Washington. 6 This interesting
system provides trial court support as well to most of the tribes,
as it became apparent such a need existed after the intertribal
court system had originally begun as an attempt by the Quinault
Tribe to create a cooperative circuit appellate court.87 Whereas
trial court support is to be provided on site, appeals cannot
always be held locally because several appeals must be heard at
each sitting. The three-judge appellate panels apply the substantive and procedural laws of the appropriate host tribes and travel
frora reservation to reservation so that all participating tribes may
witness their hearings.88
A. survey of Indian tribal codes88 indicates that many tribes
have developed formal provisions for appeals from tribal trial
court decisions.90 As tribal appellate remedies, these provisions
are generally quite liberal, although some limitations are provided, such as a limitation on the amount of time within which an
appeal may be made. Where such provisions are overly limited,
however, an appealing party may look to the ICRA in its own
tribal forum for relief.
An interesting illustration of this proposition is provided by the
case of Navajo Nation v. Browneyes. 91 This case involved a suc-

cessful challenge to a provision of the Navajo Tribal Code that
limited appeals to cases in which the sanctions imposed exceeded
92
a fine of $26 or a sentence of fifteen days in jail.
Appellant Browneyes had received a suspended sentence, and
on that basis his first appeal to the Navajo Court of Appeals was
dismissed. On his motion for reconsideration, however, the court
agreed to hear Browneyes's claim that the limitation on appeals
85. Report on the Northwest Intertribal Court System, 1 T.C.R. B-68, B-71 (1979).
86. Chehalis, Lummi, Muckleshoot, Nisqually, Port Gamble, Puyallup, Quinault,
Sauk-Suiattle, Shoalwater Bay, Skokomish, Squaxin Island, Suquamish, Swinomish, and
Upper Skagit. Each contributes to a three-judge appellate panel structured so that no
member of any panel will be associated with the case at hand.
87. 1 T.C.R. B-68, B-71 (1979).
88. Id. at B-68, B-71 to -72.
89. A very useful compilation in microform of the codes is INDIAN TRIBAL CODES (R.
Johnson ed. 1982).
90. It is not uncommon to find provisions specifying appeal, not to a tribal court,
but to the tribal council or a court created specially by the council (the latter especially
when the tribe is a party).
91. 1 T.C.R. A-86 (Ct. App. Navajo Nation 1978).
92. N.T.C. § 172 (§ 302, 1977 compilation). The limitation was designed apparently
to stem a feared tide of appeals.
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in the Navajo Tribal Code was violative of equal protection
under the ICRA. This was a claim some federal courts would
have taken on a writ of habeas corpus on the basis that the tribal
code provision prevented Browneyes from pursuing his tribal
remedy. The better place for the claim, however, was the Navajo
Court of Appeals.
The court agreed that equal protection required dissolving the
code provision because it limited appeals. First, the court said
that equal protection requires that ' any classification rest on
"'real and not feigned differences.' ' 93 Second, the court said
that such a classification must bear a reasonable relationship to
the "'persons dealt with and to the public purposes sought to be
achieved.' , 94 The court explained that:
To say that an appeal does not present an issue worthy of
appellate consideration merely because the sentence is less than
15 days in jail or less than $26 is to ignore the fact that judges
may make mistakes even when small sentences or judgments
are given.
In that the Rules of Appellate Procedure require substantial
grounds for an appeal to be stated, the number of appeals is
limited to those that present genuine issues. 95
The rule that an appeal present a genuine issue is somewhat
comparable in theory to the rule in federal habeas corpus practice
affecting state prisoners, though in practice it is probably more
liberal. A petitioner in state custody, for example, who fails to
comply with a state contemporaneous objection requirement
must clearly establish the existence both of cause for that failure
and actual prejudice to the defendant from the procedural
default. 96
93. Id. at A-88, quoting Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954).
94. Navajo Nation v. Browneyes, 1 T.C.R. at A-88, quoting Champlin Ref. Co. v.
Cruse, 115 Colo. 329, 173 P.2d 213 (1946). It has been suggested that the Navajo appeals
court's use of authority in Browneyes was overly conservative, and that it need only have
considered some less confining balancing test weighing the scope of individual rights
against "the legitimate interests of the tribe in maintaining the traditional values of their
unique governmental and cultural identity." Case Comment, 1 T.C.R. at A-90, quoting
Janis v. Wilson, 385 F. Supp. 1143, 1150 (D.S.D. 1974). It is not extraordinary, however.
The quoted language above relates only generally to the scope of the individual rights
enumerated in the ICRA; the Navajo court wanted statements interpreting equal protection in particular. The doctrine of equal protection has developed with virtually identical

standards in the various jurisdictions within the United States.
95. 1 T.C.R. at A-88.
96. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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Because of the judicially created requirement that an alleged
violation has resulted in actual prejudice to the defendant, the
rule that a petition for appeal must present a "genuine issue" will
effectively screen out many claims that would also be barred from
federal habeas corpus relief.
Thus frivolous claims should largely be prevented under both
these types of rules of appellate procedure and the federal judicial
gloss on habeas corpus. It is the latter, of course, that created the
exhaustion doctrine well before it was written into the federal
Judicial Code in 1948. 91 Federal courts do, however, potentially
provide review to a petitioner whose appeal petition to the appeals court of the tribe is conclusively denied, as well as for those
whose tribal appeal is unsatisfactory in result.
Conclusion
In sum, the requirement of exhaustion of tribal remedies is a
judicially created safeguard. It is appropriate because it harmonizes with the tenor of the ICRA and the intent of Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez. It is, moreover, beneficial because it effectuates the federal Indian law policy of according the concomitants of sovereignty to the tribal governments.
The underpinnings of tribal sovereignty are even more compelling than that of the several states upon which the exhaustion of
local remedies doctrine is premised. The policies and law
militating in favor of exhaustion of tribal remedies also appropriately enlighten the judicial approach in other areas of Indian law. The tribal judicial systems generally, like other tribal
governmental instrumentalities, are growing stronger and should
not be regarded as mere fledgling institutions in the administration of justice.

97. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c) (1982). See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 20,
at § 4264. See generally Developments in the Law. FederalHabeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L.
REv. 1038, 1093-1103 (1970).
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